• This article argues that the analytical pendulum has swung too far in prioritizing consumption in analyses of the cultural economy. The article adopts a version of the 'production of culture' perspective and is illustrated through discussion of three interrelated fields of the cultural economy: the new economy, creativity and consumption. The article argues in favour of studies of the material culture of production (redefined to take in the whole 'cycle' of the making and shaping of cultural commodities) and recommends this as a basis of policy development.
Introduction
This article argues an unfashionable point: that the analytical pendulum has swung too far in prioritizing consumption in analyses of the cultural economy. Arguably, this swing has effaced the analysis, and appreciation, of production. The objective here is not to simply replace one extreme position with another, but rather to argue that a more informative perspective should include production and consumption through an analysis of their interpenetration. Accordingly, this article argues in favour of a more holistic perspective of the interlinked processes of production and consumption. Furthermore, it is argued that an unhelpful conception of the culture-economy relationship maps onto, and underpins, this artificial separation of production and consumption. The article is illustrated through discussion of three interrelated fields of the cultural economy: the new economy, creativity and consumption.
Cultural economy
The field of mass communications studies contains within it a substantive tradition of analyses from a political economy perspective that tend to focus on issues of ownership and control and on issues of regulation (for example, Golding and Murdock, 1996; Herman and McChesney, 1997) . Likewise, there is a substantial body of work, reception theory, concerned with the analysis and interpretation of content, its meaning and regulation (see Hay et al., 1996) . However, I want to link my argument in this article to the 'production of culture' perspective developed by Peterson (1976) , which in many respects mediates between both approaches, suggesting that the organization of cultural production influences content. The body of work pioneered by Peterson developed a strong institutional trajectory.
The value of this perspective is that it seeks to present cultural outputs as the result of collective innovation by a number of participants whose participation is various, but linked together by the organization of production. Thus, it directs our attention to the analysis of complex organizational forms that constitute particular cultural forms, as well as individual positioning within them. Production in this sense is not only suggestive of creative and innovative ideas, but also of the conditions under which these ideas may be mobilized. The conditions here may be structured by means of the market, social institutions or individual taste. Not surprisingly, Petersons's work owes a debt to the oeuvre of Bourdieu (for example, Bourdieu, 1993) .
However, a weakness in the 'production of culture' approach would seem to be an appreciation and articulation of the situated nature of this activity. In this respect, it is helpful to draw upon the recent work in economic geography that has sought to address the issue of the interface between economy and culture and its spatiality. Again, geographers have drawn upon institutional perspectives to fashion an account of the situated nature of economic action and the ways in which this is articulated to place (see Amin and Thrift, 1994; Hodgson, 1988) and to cultural production (see Scott, 2000; Storper, 1997) .
In this article, I want to offer some sketches of three current fields of debate in the area of 'cultural economy' and suggest how a spatialized production of culture approach may offer some useful insights.
Creativity
The notion of creativity as a unique individual quality that may animate individuals and networks is an attractive yet illusory idea. The notion does not seem held down by mundane issues of application and implementation and it is perhaps for this reason that politicians like to invoke it as a general 'fix it'. For example, in Britain in the post-1997 election period of 'New' Labour, the Department of National Heritage was rebranded the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and a whole new raft of policyorientated initiatives set in place. Arguably, the most significant act was the creation of the Creative Industries Task Force, 1 whose most notable legacy was the Creative Industries Mapping Document (DCMS, 1998) . This report sought to quantify the contribution of creativity to the economy. In this respect, it was very successful although it did not carry any immediate policy implications. At a higher level, the emergence of the focus on creativity in UK policy making can be seen to be part of a broader strategy aimed at building a 'competitive knowledge economy' (see DTI, 1999) : new growth and income come from innovation. Creativity can be evoked here twice: first, as a mode of innovation; and, second, as an area of economic activity: the creative industries. Within this context, one of the possible 'levers' to pull from a policy perspective would seem to be to nurture talent, and, in this respect, it would suggest that creativity should figure in education policy; indeed, the National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education's report All Our Futures (NACCCE, 1999) seeks to make these connections. The other 'policy lever' concerns the promotion of the creative industries.
We might ask, with some justification, why just the creative industries? Are not all industries creative? Following on from debates about the emergent organizational forms of post-Fordism, we could discount analyses of creativity as uniquely found in a small number of expressive activities (notably the creative industries). While there are clearly some organizational fields in which creativity is configured at a premium, in others it is either discouraged or discounted. Accordingly, the conclusion must be that it is the organizational form that constitutes 'creativity' in a particular setting. In this light, the creative industries are such a particularity. Thus, there would seem to be no point in arguing that the creative industries are any more or less creative than others; nor are cultural businesses, just because they produce 'creative' products, any more or less likely to provide examples of creative management. What is called for are analyses that are not rooted in atomistic or reductive assumptions about creativity, but rather that seek to understand how creativity is manifest in different ways in differing organizational contexts.
There are many parallels with this critique of creativity and that of innovation and entrepreneurship. In this literature, innovation tends to be characterized by an atomistic and individualistic model where innovation or creativity is 'located' in individuals. Obviously, individuals are a primary source of creativity, but, like innovation, it is inappropriate to simply seek to increase the 'creativity' quotient of each individual in the hope that this will make a significant difference.
Creativity and innovation require a context in which they may be nurtured, developed and passed on or made into something more generally useful (see Lundvall, 1992) . Creativity requires a context and organization. This is not to suggest that creativity is all contexts. While it is clear that some contexts and organizational settings enable creativity to flourish, the truth must lie in a complex interaction of the two -which we might better think of as a duality rather than a dualism. In other words, creativity is a process (requiring actants, knowledge, networks and technologies) that interconnects novel ideas and contexts.
It is for the above sets of reasons that I prefer to steer clear of 'creativity' and favour a broader notion of innovation (albeit in a cautious manner), and that I also do not like the notion of 'creative industries' and prefer the more specific 'cultural industries'. Of course, the notion of the cultural industries is not straightforward either. As I argue elsewhere (see Pratt, 1997 Pratt, , 2000b Pratt, , 2002a , a case can be made for looking at those domains of economic activity that are focused on a cultural output (very loosely, the audiovisual industries, sport, live performance, heritage and the visual arts). Moreover, consistent with the 'production of culture' perspective, it can be argued that conceptually we need to consider the full 'cycle' of production and consumption (from idea to manufacture, distribution and consumption). 2 A key point about such conceptual and empirical attempts to 'pin down' the cultural sector is that they create an analytical space within which to explore the diversity within the sector (across industries) and across the production/consumption cycle. However, while some small steps have been made toward the crude statistical mapping of the sector, detailed organizational and operational analyses are few and far between (for partial but indicative analyses, see Caves, 2000; Hesmondhalgh, 2002; Scott, 2000; Vogel, 2001) .
New economy
If creativity is viewed by some as inevitable and all embracing, it has a partner in the lexicon of strategic policy making: the new economy. The term 'new economy' is problematic. To establish a 'new' economy implies rupture, periodization and formations. What was the old economy and when did the transition occur? What makes the 'new' new? Is it the application of novel technologies to new organizational forms that produce new forms of productive 'efficiencies'? This is the story of at least the last 100 years; it is difficult to see the case for a step change or a rupture. For the most part, accounts that use the term 'new economy' are locked into a fairly crude form of technological determinism, and one with a short time horizon too.
The worst cases are to be found in the internet-related industries and their commentators; a classic example is Kelly (1998) , whose book New Rules for the New Economy 3 neatly sums up the hype of the 'wired generation'. Slightly more circumscribed, yet not immune to the same hype, is Robert Reich, ex-Labor Secretary in Clinton's administration, who writes in The Future of Success (2000) of the 'age of the terrific deal', where the new economy is characterized as the ability to constantly switch products and services, the organizational consequences of which he explores (in particular, what we now call the 'work/life' balance).
US commentators have become somewhat concerned of late that the vast investment in the new economy (i.e. computers and software) has not produced any noticeable efficiency savings (see, for example, Gordon, 2000; Jorgensen and Stiroh, 2000; Oliner and Sichel, 2000) . Allied to the 'dot.bomb', such a message seems to be used as a means of writing off the role of new technology in economic change. Even if one accepts the premise that 'computers = new economy', any analyst conversant with sociology of scientific knowledge literature would not be surprised at such an outcome -although obviously some economists are! Without doubt, part of the problem with a notion such as the new economy is its vagueness; in this sense, it is an easy target. I think that if we drop the revolutionary rhetoric, avoid a tendency to universalism and look in more detail, there is an interesting story, but, as always, we have to be careful and precise.
We can take as an example the case of new media. 4 Of course, the term 'new media' itself is not exempt from the category of criticisms already outlined above for new economy. However, I want to simply use it as a label, specifically to refer to software and services for the internet and computer-based delivery of similar products (i.e. CD-ROMs and computer games). 5 Within this, I would draw a clear distinction between the internet and games, as they have quite distinct institutional and market structures and consumption patterns. Let us only consider new media. If we slip back to the new economy rhetoric, we find a rich vein of literature that was totally obsessed with the revolutionary capacity of digital reproduction and communication to transform economic practice, business models and space, such as the 'economistas' of the business press (Cairncross, 1997; Coyle, 1997) , whose book titles announced the arrival of The Weightless World and The Death of Distance. These were underpinned by the writings of well-respected economists such as Quah (1996) . My own work seeks to directly challenge this literature through detailed, theoretically-informed analyses of new media agglomerations in New York and San Francisco (Pratt, 2000a (Pratt, , 2002b . The findings show that, despite the apparent possibility, created by telecommunications, of no longer needing to be present to 1 2 2 communicate with others, most still choose to be so. They do so at considerable cost, so location clearly matters. The cost of flights or premium ground rent is not insignificant. In part, this is due to the 'lossiness' of communications technologies (it is the final 1 percent of bandwidth/communication that can be crucial for the subtleties of communication). The face-to-face meeting still matters, particularly in the field of knowledge and information exchange and in hiring and recruitment across firms. In addition, go into web designers' offices and you see people grouped around screens, touching and pointing at objects and arguing about them. Thus, my conclusion is that space and place -and the associated sociality -possibly matter more, rather than less, for new media companies. 6 By extension, if new media is at the core of the new economy, then not only are reports of the 'death of distance' premature, but considerably more attention needs to be paid to the social relations of cultural production rather than technology or transport costs.
Consumption
For most of their history, the social sciences have focused more on production and less on consumption; in extreme cases, treating consumers as dupes or simple utility maximizers. As is well known, the swathe of research that emerged in the 1980s from cultural studies shifted this agenda in a number of positive ways. Just as Derrida pointed to the death of the author, economic sociologists and economic geographers might have proclaimed the death of the producer. The shift to the analysis of audiences in mainstream media/cultural studies and the notion of active viewers have undoubtedly reinvigorated the analysis of the 'active consumer' (for example, Fiske, 1989) . The idea has also set the scene for an upsurge of interest in shopping as a cultural activity. We can welcome the spatial turn in retail literature that has highlighted the situated and occasioned nature of the shopping experience as well as the performativity of 'retailers' (see Crang, 1994; Jackson and Thrift, 1995; Jackson et al., 2000; Wrigley and Lowe, 2002) .
However, while we do need to be reminded that people are discerning consumers, that price is not the only determining factor in a purchase and that much else is going on in these social situations in addition to (or sometimes instead of) shopping, something has still been passed over. What I think we have left underdeveloped is what we used to call the 'political economy of retail'. Why have retailers suddenly 'discovered' that shopping is fun? Clearly, one issue is declining margins and fierce competition -how retailers entice people not only to buy from them, but also to buy more. It is true that these sorts of macroanalyses can be found, for example in Harvey's (1989) work. These arguments point to the attempt to 'spectacularize' consumption 7 to fight the spectre of 'underconsumption'. Thus, it is not only the case of one product being set against another, but also one consumption space or a whole city 8 against another. Of course, this literature links back to debates about global/local interactions. It also highlights that behind that the changing staging of retailing and consumption more generally is a backspace which is itself transforming (indeed, some transformations enable the front of house changes). Developments in distribution logistics have given rise to dramatic organizational changes in retailing. For example, novel and interactive telecommunications enable production, stockholding and distribution strategies that create new (although usually largely invisible) relationships between producers and consumers. 9 Adoption of this computer/communications mediation of retailing (and the whole production chain) does not happen evenly, nor simply. The new hybridities of retail, production and distribution thus morph into the hybrid 'bricks and clicks' physically-based internet shopping outfit. The basic point is that if commodities are produced, however much telecommunications infrastructure you interpolate them with, their atoms still need to be shifted around somehow.
My interest in these interconnections also draws me to work that follows networks from the supermarket shelf to the producers (see Acre and Marsden, 1993; Leslie and Reimer, 1999) . 10 In many cases, the incentive here is a radical politicized consumer who wishes to exercise their 'power' (for example, by supporting fair trade or the ethical consumption movement). Researchers have highlighted the webs and networks that are woven to sustain and support particular styles of consumption, whether it is the 'exotic' foods on supermarket shelves or the producers of the brand name sports and fashion goods (however, even this work has a tendency to fold back on to consumers in the 'biographies and geographies' approach; see Cook et al., 1998) .
The message here is clear: there is a link, a relationship, between production and consumption, one that is articulated through distribution and consumer consciousness. Moreover, this relationship is manifest in and across places. We commonly refer to 'street fashions' and 'learning from the street' in high fashion production; this is a clear reference to the beneficial co-location of cultural producers and consumers where fashion ideas may be picked up and tested. A more diffuse version of this is the buzz around many cultural producers that makes it attractive for competitors to be close to one another and thus participate in this 'gossip'. This approach is commensurate with the idea of 'product spaces' (see Cawson et al., 1995) which offer the potential to conceptualize a web woven through the social shaping of technologies, organization, markets, spaces and products (see Pratt, 2000a Pratt, , 2002b . Cawson et al. (1995) focus on user engagement with products and the feedback to producers; in a broad sense, these analyses push the envelope of production and consumption.
Such information networks are dynamic. For example, the decisions of a UK supermarket to change a product specification may make or break a local economy in the developing world. This is not simply a buy/not buy decision; issues of total quality control imposed by retailers may lead to producers having to adopt new ways of working or tending for their produce if they are to satisfy overseas markets. One can see a quite different, but parallel articulation of this process in the production of more conventional cultural products such as world music. The logical conclusion pushes us towards the point that production/consumption dualisms are unhelpful; rather, it would be more useful to explore the constitution of products situated in and across places and social networks.
Conclusions
This article has sought to consider how production might be recovered in an analysis of the cultural economy. We have noted how dualisms have opened up between political economic analyses of the cultural industries as well as reception and audience studies. The production of culture perspective was offered as a complement to these viewpoints. The notion of the 'production of culture' was then applied to three areas of contemporary concern: creativity, the new economy and consumption. The overview of these three areas has led us to a rather iconoclastic point. It used to be fashionable to criticize old Marxists as 'productivist'. Perhaps it is now time to lay a similar, but opposite charge at the door of the new 'consumptionists'. I think that there is much to be gained from a finergrained anthropological sense of the making and shaping of things through a long 'life cycle' that necessarily incorporates both production and consumption. It might be expected that the new sub-/interdisciplinary field of material cultural studies would fit the bill. However, in practice, if one scans the contents lists of such journals, one finds study after study of consumption. Thus, while I would not argue for a return to a political economy perspective per se, I think that it is a study of the material culture of production (in fact, one redefined to take in the whole 'cycle' of the making and shaping of cultural commodities) that should be on our agenda. Of course, such a perspective is not monodimensional; there are numerous points of articulation and rearticulation along a chain/network/cycle. This issue of the articulation and rearticulation of the production of culture does, I think, signal another opening for research that goes beyond the focus on regulation. Governance is a term that has been used by political scientists in recent years to express the broader means by which activities are coordinated beyond simple state regulation and control. Following this usage, there are two potential research agendas that might be explored. First, the role of the state and government as normally defined in relation to culture: what role should the state have and for what reasons should it intervene? This is a massive topic that I will leave aside for now. More closely related to the aims of this article is the second of these two agendas: to understand both within and across organizations, institutions and networks the modes and means of coordination and control. Both these themes are, in my mind, linked to the issue of hybridization -the way in which, in empirical terms, cultural practices take place both in the economic, state and civil society and in the personal realm and how they are, at one and the same moment, public and private, social and economic, and so on. The challenge for anyone seeking to understand the 'production of culture' is not to 'box off' culture, but to follow its making. Related to this is the question of policy making. The foundation of policy must be sound information collection and analysis: an evidential base. However, the conceptual position outlined in this article is highly suggestive of the fact that policy and governance debates may not currently be founded on either an adequate understanding or conceptualization of the objects that they seek to address.
Notes
1 The term 'creative industries' seems to have been adopted for two reasons: first, to distance itself from the 'old labour' and Marxian overtones of the cultural industries; and, second, to embrace an agenda that sought to offer the role that culture (now creativity) could add when harnessed to the 'traditional economy'. Thus, the instrumental use of 'culture' or 'creativity' to secure economic ends. 2 This concept, initially called the cultural industries production system (see Pratt, 1997) , now modified to cultural industries production network, has been deployed in several UK regional planning documents and now forms a central core of the DCMS 's Regional Cultural Data Framework (2003) . The approach has many similarities to frameworks produced by Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 3 The subtitle 10 Ways that the Network Economy Is Changing Everything signals a resonance with Castells's The Rise of the Network Society (1996) . His story is also moved on by a strong strain of the 'techno-economic paradigm' of the institutional school. 4 Here, we can refer back to the 'production of culture' perspective that would underline the institutional variety, and thus the need for distinctive analyses, of the cultural and creative economy. 5 The argument for the use of the term is that developers use this term to describe their own activities. Importantly, as I note in Pratt (2000a) , developers deploy the term strategically to position themselves against other activities; this is a process of constructing an industry and a market. 6 The other point that I would mention is that the new economy evangelists, while stressing near zero reproduction and distribution costs, conveniently forget that production still does cost, and costs a lot. Moreover, production involves people, they have to work, eat and sleep somewhere and they need to be in an 'organized' form of production that involves interaction with others. 7 In Harvey's case, he is talking, on the one hand, more generally about consumption and, on the other hand, about cities, the consumption of their image, and cities as sites or crucibles for consumption. 8 This is played out in the realm of 'place marketing', notably articulated with major sports (World Cup football or the Olympic Games) or cultural installations (Guggenheim art galleries). See Pratt (2002a) . 9 For example, just-in-time production, zero warehousing stock strategies and satellite tracking of logistics. 10 This work also draws upon more general work on value chains, such as Gereffi and Kaplinsky (2001) .
